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Masking the Reemergence of Immutability 
with “Outcomes for Children” 
Ginger Grimes* 
The 2014 Michigan trial DeBoer v. Snyder involved a challenge 
to a 2004 voter initiative amending the state’s constitution to ban same-sex 
marriage. DeBoer was one of four consolidated cases from the Sixth 
Circuit granted certiorari to the Supreme Court in January 2015, known 
collectively as Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme 
Court handed down its historic decision in Obergefell, requiring states to 
license marriages between two people of the same sex and to recognize 
marriages between two people of the same sex when their marriage was 
lawfully licensed out of state. Obergefell has thus left open the opportunity 
for litigation over whether sexual orientation-based classifications warrant 
heightened scrutiny. Same-sex-marriage-ban defenders in DeBoer had 
argued that because marriage often involves children and children learn from 
their parents, same-sex parents provide a less than ideal environment for 
children based on the impact of the parents’ sexual orientation on their 
children. The defenders argue that this impact leads to poorer “outcomes for 
children.” The debate over marriage equality therefore became a question of 
whether same-sex parents reproduce their own gender and sexual orientation 
identities onto their children; in other words, the debate becomes a question 
of the immutability of such traits. This debate is characterized as a 
“distraction” because courts no longer recognize immutability as a dispositive 
factor in an Equal Protection level-of-scrutiny analysis. This Note argues 
that children are the unique condition that allows the debate about 
immutability to resurface in the context of purported governmental interests. 
This Note then concludes with a warning for advocates to be aware of this 
 
* J.D. 2015, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Christopher 
Tomlins and Douglas NeJaime for their feedback and encouragement. Thank you also to Jack Williams 
and Marco Pulido for their thoughtful comments during the writing process. 
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trap and redirect the debate to normative questions about gender, sexuality, 
and sexual orientation. 
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  Now, your Honor, I’m sure you’re thinking, counsel, what about the recent decisions 
in Utah and Virginia and Oklahoma, why shouldn’t this case turn out any different? 
My response to you, your Honor, is unfortunately those courts lost sight of the proper 
standard. They forgot who should define marriage. 
. . . . 
  But even more notable is that none of these three decisions challenged the premise that 
it’s beneficial for a child to have both a mom and a dad. Instead, in those cases the courts 
claim that point would not justify excluding same sex couples.1 
 
Equal protection challenges to laws distinguishing a class of persons defined 
by their sexual orientation have become increasingly common over the last two 
decades. Courts’ understanding of sexual orientation in this context has evolved to 
a point of settlement: sexual orientation is viewed as so integral to a person’s identity 
that it is not appropriate to require an individual to change his or her orientation in 
order to avoid discriminatory treatment.2 The immutability of sexual orientation is 
therefore relevant but not dispositive in an Equal Protection level-of-scrutiny 
analysis. Although diverging on the level of protection warranted by sexual 
orientation-based classifications, courts have generally agreed that they need not 
 
1. Transcript of Record, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 48, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 
2014) (No. 12-10285). 
2. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008). 
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decide whether a person’s sexual orientation is immutable in order to afford 
protections to sexual orientation-based classes.3 
The debate over immutability, however, has reemerged in the context of LGB4 
parenting. Ironically, the debate has reemerged in the very same cases in which 
immutability is sidelined in regard to whether sexual orientation deserves heightened 
scrutiny. The focus has shifted to the strength of the government’s purported 
interest in discriminatory marriage laws rather than the level of scrutiny for the 
classification. Whether LGB identity can or should be transmitted from parent to 
child—a question that ultimately pertains to the immutability of such an identity—
is framed as a debate over the impact of parents’ sexual orientation on “outcomes 
for children.”5 On one side of the debate, gay-rights advocates argue that social 
scientists and organizations specializing in the psychiatric and emotional well-being 
of children generally agree on the “No Difference Consensus”—the notion that 
there is no difference between outcomes for children of same-sex parents and 
children of opposite-sex parents.6 On the other side, traditional-marriage defenders 
and opponents of same-sex parenting argue that the social science on outcomes for 
children is too new and unsettled to create a dispositive answer to the debate, and 
that studies repeatedly show that an intact marital family with a mother and a father 
provides the ideal environment for children.7 Although not made in explicit terms, 
the arguments offered for and against LGB parental rights allow the debate over 
immutability to resurface. This has occurred through the abstraction of “outcomes,” 
which are measured in part by a child’s gender expression,8 gender identity,9 and 
understanding of his or her own sexuality. 
 
3. For example, in 2012, a federal district court in Nevada granted a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss a complaint challenging Nevada’s prohibition of same-sex marriage in its constitution and 
statutory law. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1021 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 
771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). The decisions in In re Marriage Cases and Kerrigan fell on the opposite side 
of the fight for LGB rights than the court in Sevcik, yet all courts agreed that they did not need to issue 
a final ruling on the mutability of sexual orientation identity. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384; Kerrigan, 
957 A.2d 407. 
4. In this Note, I will use “LGB” to describe the sexual orientation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
parents. While gender nonconforming and trans identities are certainly relevant to the topic of 
parenting, I limit my analysis in this Note to the impact of sexual orientation identity on outcomes for 
children. 
5. There have been numerous amicus briefs submitted on behalf of pro-gay plaintiffs. See, e.g., 
Brief for American Psychological Association, et al. Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees at 33–34, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). 
6. See, e.g., Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter? 
66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 163 (2001) (arguing that most research in psychology concludes that there are 
no differences in developmental outcomes between children raised by lesbian and gay parents and 
children raised by straight parents). 
7. See, e.g., Brief of Social Science Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13–28, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). 
8. Gender expression is “how a person outwardly expresses their gender.” An Ally’s Guide to 
Terminology, GLAAD & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (2012), available at www.glaad.org/
sites/default/files/allys-guide-to-terminology_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7FT-XLH6]. 
9. Gender identity is “one’s internal sense of gender.” Id. 
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This Note analyzes the recent Michigan trial DeBoer v. Snyder,10 which 
highlights the reemergence of the debate over the immutability of sexual 
orientation. DeBoer involved a challenge to a 2004 voter initiative amending 
Michigan’s Constitution to ban same-sex marriage.11 The opening epigraph of this 
Note, taken from opening statements by counsel for State Defendants, signals the 
unique focus of this trial on expert testimony as a means to determine whether the 
ban on same-sex marriage is justified by differences in outcomes for children. This 
Note examines the arguments made in DeBoer concerning the legitimacy of the 
available social science on LGB parenting and outcomes for children. It situates 
these arguments within the larger frameworks of same-sex marriage, LGB 
parenting, and sexual orientation identity. 
Part I details the development of Equal Protection jurisprudence surrounding 
sexual-orientation-based classifications and the settlement of immutability as a 
nondispositive factor. This background serves as a point of comparison for the 
argument that the reemergence of the immutability debate is a red herring, 
distracting us from the legal, social, and political debate over normative questions 
about sexual variation. 
Part II summarizes the substantive arguments made in DeBoer. This Part 
involves a close reading of the expert testimony put forth by each side. It lays out 
state rationales for same-sex marriage prohibitions and the opposing expert 
opinions on the relative importance of scientific consensus for these rationales. This 
Part uncovers how vague arguments about “outcomes for children” mask fears 
about the transmission of sexual orientation identity. Moreover, it borrows from 
noted gay-rights scholars to reveal how the stated government interest in dual-
gender, biological parents is, at its core, a desire for parents to be straight role 
models. 
Part III analyzes why the reemergence of the immutability debate is 
significant. It argues that where the immutability of sexual orientation is otherwise 
settled for level-of-scrutiny analysis, the introduction of children to the debate 
allows opponents of gay rights to use outcomes for children as a proxy for their 
anxieties about the production and reproduction of divergent sexual orientation and 
gender identities, or what Professor Clifford J. Rosky calls “fear of the queer 
 
10. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-1556, 2015 WL 2473451 (June 26, 2015). In its 
historic ruling, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license marriages 
between two people of the same sex and to recognize marriage between two people of the same sex 
when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out of state. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-
1556, slip op. at 22–23, 27–28 (June 26, 2015). Notably, the Court did not take up the issue of 
“outcomes for children,” which was a unique focus in the DeBoer trial. The Court also declined to 
address the level-of-scrutiny that should be afforded to laws that employ sexual orientation-based 
classifications. In its wake, Obergefell leaves ripe for litigation the possibility that classifications based on 
sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny. 
11. DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
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child.”12 Part III then suggests advocates and courts should instead focus on more 
important normative questions about the state’s interest in producing gender-
conforming, heterosexual children. 
I. THE IMMUTABILITY FACTOR IN ASSESSING HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
A review of the doctrinal framework in which adult sexual orientation claims 
are made under the equal protection clause provides a point of comparison for the 
following sections on “outcomes for children.” This Part demonstrates how the 
immutability of adult sexual orientation is not dispositive of whether the 
orientation-based class deserves heightened scrutiny.13 Specifically, this section 
explores the evolution of the heightened scrutiny doctrine in case law and provides 
a brief overview of why the immutability of sexual orientation was a controversial 
factor in litigation. It concludes by showing that in recent Equal Protection 
decisions, immutability has become less contentious and courts have begun to 
privilege a narrative vision of sexual orientation identity over abstruse scientific 
consensus. 
The “tiers of scrutiny” approach to Equal Protection first emerged in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., a case involving interstate commerce in skimmed milk.14 
The Supreme Court held that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional” unless there is a reason to 
“preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”15 However, in its famous Footnote 
Four, the Court recognized that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition . . . curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [therefore] may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”16 In the years following Carolene 
 
12. Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 607, 608 (2012) (arguing 
government has no legitimate interest in “encouraging children to be straight”). 
13. Among the factors in evaluating which level of scrutiny a class is afforded under the Equal 
Protection clause, courts consider approximately four factors: (1) whether the class has a history of 
discrimination against it; (2) whether the classification is related to the class’s ability to contribute to 
society; (3) whether the class is sufficiently politically powerless; and (4) whether the classification is 
immutable. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011) 
(noting, however, that “[d]ifferent courts emphasize different factors without any real explanation why 
some are more important than others”). Id. at 138–39. I use “approximately” because courts describe 
and apply these factors in different ways; for example, Strauss also identifies a fifth factor: the relevancy 
of the trait. Id. at 146. Strauss also pointed out the following: 
[I]t is not clear whether a suspect class must meet all of [the factors], most of them, or just 
some of them. After over fifty years of employing these factors, significant questions still 
remain about the meaning of the factors for determining one of the most important 
questions in constitutional law: whether and when a legislative judgment involving equal 
protection of the law should be rigorously scrutinized by a court. 
Id. at 147. 
14. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 152 n.4. 
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Products, the Court developed a framework for evaluating which classes deserved 
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause.17 
Immutability as a factor precipitating heightened scrutiny first emerged in a 
plurality decision in Frontiero v. Richardson.18 The Court, in finding that discrimination 
based on sex warranted heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause, 
stated a number of reasons for its decision: laws have historically been based on 
“gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes . . . comparable to that of blacks 
under the pre-Civil War slave codes”;19 “women still face pervasive, although at 
times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market 
and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena”;20 “sex, like race and 
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”;21 “the 
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society”;22 and finally, “Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to 
sex-based classifications.”23 
Nearly a decade later, the Court considered the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick24 and whether the Constitution “confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”25 Although the Court 
relied upon the substantive due process clause to uphold the sodomy statute,26 the 
Court’s reasoning is nonetheless applicable to the alleged mutability of sexual 
orientation identity. The Court’s framing of the issue as the “right of homosexuals 
to engage in acts of sodomy,” or “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy,”27 emphasizes its perception of conduct, rather than identity, as definitive 
of the class. The Court found the Georgia law was supported by a rational basis—
the moralistic view that “homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”28 
Interestingly, the Bowers Court found that there was “[n]o connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the 
other.”29 
 
17. Strauss, supra note 13, at 144 (identifying Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944), as the first instance in which the Court first referred to race as a suspect class). 
18. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
19. Id. at 685. 
20. Id. at 686. 
21. Id. (emphasis added). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 687 (providing the example of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
25. Id. at 190. 
26. The Court applies heightened scrutiny to those rights deemed to be fundamental under the 
substantive due process clause. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942) 
(striking down a law involving the forced sterilization of convicts because marriage and procreation are 
basic civil rights, and thus strict scrutiny of the law is required). 
27. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
28. Id. at 196. 
29. Id. at 191. 
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Following the adverse decision in Bowers, the pro-gay rights movement began 
to embrace immutability, arguing that scientific experiments proved that human 
sexual orientation is biological.30 Advocates reasoned that if gay and lesbian identity 
were biologically determined, it could be distinguished from the Court’s treatment 
of homosexual sodomy as voluntary conduct in Bowers.31 As Janet Halley points out 
in her critique of the immutability factor, this essentialist view of sexual orientation 
entirely fails to represent those pro-gay constituencies that deny the 
centrality of a particularized homosexual orientation to their psychic 
makeup, whether because they identify as bisexual, because they seek to 
de-emphasize the gender parameters of sexuality, because they are 
experimental about sexuality, or because they experience sexuality not as 
serious self-expressiveness but as play, drag, and ironic self-reflexivity.32 
The pro-gay essentialist legal argument relying on biological causation thus leaves 
out the voices of many LGB-identified individuals who are critical of the view that 
they are a minority defined by a “natural” identity.33 Simultaneously, opponents of 
gay rights likewise argue homosexual orientation is biologically fixed—that 
discrimination toward the group should be tailored “to express normative 
judgments, deter manifestations of homosexual orientation, or to cure homosexuals 
of their illness”—or alternatively, if homosexual orientation is mutable, 
discrimination should be designed to convert gay and lesbian desire into 
heterosexuality34 
In 1996, pro-gay advocates successfully challenged the validity of an 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, 
or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination in 
Romer v. Evans.35 The Court, without asking whether a more searching inquiry would 
be appropriate, held that the law failed to meet even rational basis review.36 The 
Court found the amendment “impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated disability on 
a single named group,” and “its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons 
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward 
the class it affects.”37 Careful to avoid a ruling on the scrutiny warranted by the 
classification, the Court stated in broad terms that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional 
because it “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection 
across the board.”38 
 
30. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from 
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (1994). 
31. Id. at 512–14. 
32. Id. at 520. 
33. Id. at 504–05. 
34. Id. at 517. 
35. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
36. Id. at 632. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 633. 
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Seven years later, the Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.39 In a 6–3 
decision, the Court struck down Texas’s law criminalizing sodomy, finding the 
liberty interest protected by substantive due process under the due process clause 
extended to intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults.40 The Court did 
not address whether sexual orientation warranted heightened scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause, nor did it explicitly address any of the factors relevant to 
such an inquiry.41 Cases in the context of sexual-orientation-based classifications 
subsequent to Lawrence have focused on the political powerlessness factor,42 and the 
fight over the immutability of sexual orientation under the equal protection clause 
in the last decade has been relatively quiet. 
The gay rights movement then began to utilize state litigation. In 2008, the 
California Supreme Court considered a case consolidating six separate challenges to 
the state’s Family Code, which defined marriage as between a man and a woman.43 
The Court distinguished the challenge from other state challenges to same-sex 
marriage bans because California had created a domestic partnership scheme under 
which same-sex couples received virtually all of the same legal benefits and 
privileges that married couples were afforded.44 The California Supreme Court 
subjected the statute to strict scrutiny on two grounds: first because sexual 
orientation is a suspect classification under the California Constitution,45 and 
second because the differential treatment accorded to same-sex couples impinged 
upon same-sex couples’ fundamental privacy interest in having an official family 
relationship accorded with equal respect and dignity as that of an opposite-sex 
couple.46 Concluding sexual orientation is a suspect classification, the Court 
 
39. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
40. Id. 
41. See Strauss, supra note 13, at 146 (listing the basic factors for determining suspect class 
status). 
42. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 645–46 (“[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct 
tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities . . . and, of course, care about 
homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power 
much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.”); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 
996, 1009–10 (D. Nev. 2012) (“In the present case, it simply cannot be disputed that there have 
historically been sufficient pro-homosexual legislators (or anti-homosexual and indifferent legislators 
who can be democratically bargained with) in the state of Nevada to protect homosexuals from 
oppression as a general matter.”), rev’d sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446–48 (Conn. 2008) (focusing on the lack of gay 
representatives in the federal judiciary, the U.S. Senate, business, academia, statewide office, and the 
state judiciary). See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, 
Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975 (2014) (analyzing the political 
powerlessness factor in Equal Protection cases brought by gay and lesbian plaintiffs). 
43. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008). 
44. Id. at 379–98. 
45. This issue was one of first impression in California. Id. at 840–41. The equal protection 
clause of the California Constitution mirrors the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, but is not “confined to [the doctrine] of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.” 
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 129–30 (Cal. 2009). 
46. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400–02. On the latter point regarding the fundamental 
right to marriage, the California Supreme Court found the public had a significant interest in marriage. 
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reasoned that “[b]ecause a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of 
one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or 
her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”47 The Court also 
implicitly referred to immutability, stating: 
[O]ur state now recognizes that an individual’s capacity to establish a loving 
and long-term committed relationship with another person and 
responsibly to care for and raise children does not depend on the 
individual’s orientation, and, more generally, that an individual’s sexual 
orientation—like a person’s race or gender—does not constitute a legitimate 
basis upon which to deny or withhold legal rights.48 
The California Supreme Court ultimately found the designation of marriage as a 
union “between a man and a woman” unconstitutional. 
The same year, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether same-sex 
couples were subject to discrimination because of their sexual orientation in 
violation of the Connecticut Constitution.49 Integral to this decision was the 
recognition that sexual orientation constitutes a quasisuspect classification for 
purposes of the equal protection provisions of the Connecticut Constitution.50 
Looking to federal constitutional law, the Court determined immutability to be a 
relevant but not required factor for heightened scrutiny.51 Additionally, it declined 
to consider whether sexual orientation is immutable in the same way that race, 
national origin, and gender are immutable because the Court agreed with the 
plaintiffs’ contention “that their sexual orientation represents the kind of 
distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a discrete group for purposes of 
determining . . . heightened protection.”52 The Court held that it is “indisputable 
that sexual orientation ‘forms a significant part of a person’s identity,’”53 and that 
“[i]t is equally apparent that, ‘because a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an 
 
Chief Justice George stated the following: 
Society, of course, has an overriding interest in the welfare of children, and the role marriage 
plays in facilitating a stable family setting in which children may be raised by two loving 
parents unquestionably furthers the welfare of children and society. In addition, the role of 
the family in educating and socializing children serves society’s interest by perpetuating the 
social and political culture and providing continuing support for society over generations. It 
is these features that the California authorities have in mind in describing marriage as the 
“basic unit” or “building block” of society. 
Id. at 423 (citation omitted). 
47. Id. at 442–43. 
48. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). Later, however, the Court notes, “the constitutional right to 
marry has never been viewed as the sole preserve of individuals who are physically capable of having 
children.” Id. at 430. 
49. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008). 
50. Id. at 412. The Connecticut Constitution’s equal protection provisions mirror the United 
States Constitution’s. Id. 
51. Id. at 426. 
52. Id. at 436–38. 
53. Id. at 437 (citing Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
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aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or 
change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.’”54 
As challenges to state bans on same-sex marriage became more prevalent,55 
federal recognition of same-sex marriages could not be ignored. Attorney General 
Eric H. Holder, Jr. submitted a letter to House Speaker John A. Boehner outlining 
the Executive Branch’s decision not to defend Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA).56 The Department of Justice (DOJ) took the position that Section 3 
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution.57 Although the letter 
ultimately concluded that the law failed to withstand rational basis scrutiny, the DOJ 
memorandum analyzed the variables weighing in favor of heightened scrutiny 
protection for sexual orientation.58 Regarding immutability, the DOJ stated, “while 
sexual orientation carries no visible badge, a growing scientific consensus accepts 
that sexual orientation is immutable; it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual 
orientation to be hidden from view to avoid discrimination.”59 
DOMA was subsequently struck down on June 26, 2013, in United States v. 
Windsor.60 The Court defined the class protected by Equal Protection not based on 
sexual orientation, but as “those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made 
lawful by the State.”61 In striking down the law, the Court noted that DOMA 
“humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. 
The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in 
 
54. Id. at 438 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008)). 
55. Not all challenges to same-sex marriage laws have been successful. A Nevada federal 
District Court in 2012 considered whether Nevada’s constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriages 
and refusal to recognize such marriages from other jurisdictions violated same-sex couples’ equal 
protection rights. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 997 (D. Nev. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Latta v. 
Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). The District Court answered no. In a brief paragraph, the Court 
avoided the question of immutability, since the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the immutability 
of homosexuality. Id. at 1008. 
56. Section 3 of DOMA stated: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband 
or a wife. 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
57. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehener, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with author). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Because the DOJ had decided not to 
defend DOMA, a congressional group, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”), intervened to 
defend the statute’s constitutionality. On the same day, the Court issued its opinion in Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). The Court considered whether California’s Proposition 8, a voter-enacted 
ballot initiative amending California’s Constitution to ban same-sex marriage, violated the rights of 
same-sex couples under the United States Constitution. Id. at 2659. Before reaching the merits, the 
Court held that the proponents of Proposition 8 did not have standing for the appeal. Id. at 2668. 
61. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
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their community and in their daily lives.”62 Since Windsor, state and federal judges 
have issued over sixty decisions relating to same-sex marriage.63 
These cases demonstrate that, while immutability is relevant, it is neither 
dispositive nor highly contested at the present moment in gay rights litigation. Some 
courts, like in Kerrigan and In re Marriage Cases, found that sexual orientation warrants 
heightened scrutiny. Others, including Romer and Windsor, did not even address what 
level of scrutiny sexual-orientation-based classifications received because laws that 
discriminate against sexual-orientation-based classes fail to meet rational basis 
review. Generally, courts do not ask whether an identity is biologically determined, 
but whether it is central to a person’s identity such that it would be abhorrent for 
the government to penalize a person for refusing to change it. Thus, the 
immutability of sexual orientation identity is effectively settled. 
II. DEBOER V. SNYDER—A CHALLENGE TO MICHIGAN’S BAN ON  
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION LAWS 
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse live in Oakland County, Michigan. They are 
domestic partners and parents to minors N., R., and J.64 April is a nurse in a neonatal 
intensive care unit at a hospital in Detroit, and at another Detroit hospital, Jayne is 
an emergency room nurse.65 April and Jayne had volunteered to care for and adopt 
each of their three children, who were neglected by their biological parents and in 
poor medical condition after tragic circumstances surrounding their births.66 
Together, April and Jayne raise N., R., and J., and eventually hope to adopt all three 
children as coparents through second-parent adoption.67 
When April and Jayne filed their complaint, Michigan law prohibited all 
unmarried couples from jointly adopting children and thus prevented April and 
Jayne from both being legal parents to their three children on the basis of their 
marital status.68 Michigan law also prevented same-sex couples from getting 
married.69 Together, these laws operated to ban all same-sex couples from jointly 
adopting children. Laws like these, which do not explicitly ban LGB parents from 
adopting but operate instead as informal barriers to adoption, existed in a majority 
of states before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell.70 
 
62. Id. at 2694. 
63. Marriage Litigation, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation 
[http://perma.cc/7RXV-ZRXE] (last visited July 2, 2015). As of August 6, 2014, the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had cases pending on appeal. Id. 
64. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1, 8, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(No. 12-10285). The minors were named by their initials in the complaint to protect their identities. 
65. Id. ¶ 9. 
66. Complaint ¶¶ 10–12, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 12-
10285). 
67. Id. ¶ 15. 
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.24 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
69. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. I, § 25 (2004). 
70. For a chart comparing the laws on joint adoption, second-parent adoption, and step-parent 
adoption as they apply to LGBT parents, see 50 States of Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, 
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Arguments used to justify these informal bans on LGB parenting formed the 
basis for an Eleventh Circuit decision in 2004 upholding a Florida law prohibiting 
LGB parents from adopting.71 Lofton involved an equal protection challenge by 
foster parents who had been denied their applications to adopt based on their sexual 
orientation.72 Florida’s adoption law prohibited adoption by “homosexual” persons, 
defined as “applicants who are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual 
activity.”73 The Eleventh Circuit first denied that the plaintiffs had any fundamental 
right to family integrity or private sexual intimacy, which meant that the statute 
needed to survive only rational basis review.74 The court then recognized the special 
circumstances involved in parenting and reasoned that “[b]ecause of the primacy of 
the welfare of the child, the state can make classifications for adoption purposes 
that would be constitutionally suspect in many other arenas.”75 The court identified 
Florida’s interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing environment for the 
education and socialization of its adopted children as a “clearly . . . legitimate 
interest.”76 As support for its finding, the court stated, 
It is chiefly from parental figures that children learn about the world and 
their place in it, and the formative influence of parents extends well beyond 
the years spent under their roof, shaping their children’s psychology, 
character, and personality for years to come. In time, children grow up to 
become full members of society, which they in turn influence, whether for 
good or ill. The adage that “the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world” 
hardly overstates the ripple effect that parents have on the public good by 
virtue of their role in raising their children. It is hard to conceive an interest 
 
http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption [http://perma
.cc/CB2H-7PZR] (last visited July 11, 2015). As of July 11, 2015, fifteen states and D.C. allow second-
parent adoption by LGBT couples. Relatedly, only seven states support fostering by LGBT parents by 
restricting discrimination, forty-two states and D.C. are silent on fostering by LGBT parents, and only 
Nebraska restricts fostering by LGBT parents. Mississippi is the only state in which same-sex couples 
face legal restrictions when petitioning for adoption. Some states, including North Dakota, Michigan, 
and Virginia permit state-licensed child welfare agencies to refuse to place and provide services to 
children and families, including LGBT people and same-sex couples, if doing so conflicts with their 
religious beliefs. Second-Parent Adoption Laws, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://
www.familyequality.org/get_informed/equality_maps/second-parent_adoption_laws [http://perma
.cc/SUC5-LYFU] (last visited July 11, 2015). An earlier version of this site indicated that on September 
21, 2014, the majority of states had barriers restricting the ability of LGBT people and same-sex couples 
from adopting. See 50 States of Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://www
.familyequality.org/get_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption [http://web.archive.org/web/
20140921060330/http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/families_for_all/50_states_of_adoption] 
(visited Sept. 21, 2014). Only nineteen states and D.C. permitted joint adoption by same-sex couples; 
only thirteen states and D.C. permitted second-parent adoption by same-sex couples; and only six states 
explicitly banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in foster care. 
71. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 806–07 (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part, 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995)). 
74. Id. at 811–17. 
75. Id. at 810 (citing statutory preferences for certain factors in parents and placements). 
76. Id. at 819. 
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more legitimate and more paramount for the state than promoting an 
optimal social structure for educating, socializing, and preparing its future 
citizens to become productive participants in civil society—particularly 
when those future citizens are displaced children for whom the state is 
standing in loco parentis.77 
Florida claimed that its “preference for adoptive marital families was based on the 
premise that the marital family structure is more stable than household 
arrangements and that children benefit from the presence of both a father and 
mother in the home.”78 The court relied on no social science evidence—nor did it 
require that the Florida legislature base its premise in social science evidence—to 
support its finding that the ban on LGB parents was rationally related to the state’s 
interest in encouraging stable and nurturing environments for children. Instead, the 
court stated, “Given that appellants have offered no competent evidence to the 
contrary, we find this premise to be one of those ‘unprovable assumptions’ that 
nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative action.”79 
Six years after Lofton was decided, Florida was the last state to overturn its ban 
on LGB adoption.80 Yet Lofton has never been formally overruled. Moreover, the 
same assumptions about the benefits of the marital form, the need for both male 
and female role models,81 and the inadequacy of same-sex couples’ parenting persist 
in states that informally prohibit same-sex couples from adopting. 
A. “Outcomes for Children” as a Mask for Immutability Arguments 
What began in Michigan as a case about the legal right for April and Jayne to 
parent each other’s legally adopted child or children evolved into a constitutional 
challenge to the voter-initiative that amended the Michigan Constitution to prohibit 
same-sex couples from marrying. Nine months after their initial complaint was filed, 
April and Jayne filed an amended complaint, in which they sought a declaratory 
judgment invalidating the “Michigan Marriage Amendment” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause.82 
Despite the change in legal strategy, children remained at the center of the 
debate. In opening statements at trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel framed the case around 




79. Id. at 819–20 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1973)). 
80. See CNN Wire Staff, Florida Ends Ban on Gay, Lesbian Adoptions, CNN (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:21 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/22/florida.gay.adoptions/index.html [http://perma.cc/
9FDD-495M]. 
81. See Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, supra note 12, at 651 (“In the ensuing decades, the role 
modeling fear has served as the primary justification for laws that target LGBT parents, such as statutes 
prohibiting lesbian and gay people from adopting.”). 
82. Amended Complaint ¶ 26, DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 
12-10285). 
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children.”83 Likewise, Defendants84 opened their case by stating: “This case is about 
one thing, your Honor, the will of the people. The people of the State of Michigan 
have decided to retain the definition of marriage that encourages what’s best of [sic] 
children being raised by both a mom and dad.”85 
DeBoer is significant because it signaled—during a tidal wave of federal 
marriage litigation—a distraction from what should be the determinative issue: 
whether a person’s sexual orientation should be relevant to their ability to get legally 
married and be recognized by each state as such. The same-sex marriage ban 
defenders in DeBoer narrowed in on a peripheral issue, arguing that because marriage 
often involves children and children learn from their parents, there might be 
something less than ideal about an environment constructed by parents who are not 
of different sexes. But what separates same-sex parents from opposite-sex parents? 
The parents’ gender and sexuality. And to the extent that a parent’s gender or 
sexuality is relevant to a child’s upbringing, the defenders of the ban suggested that 
learning about or reproducing divergent gender identities and sexual identities as 
acceptable or even glorified creates an inferior environment to raise children.86 On 
this ground, same-sex couples should not marry or raise children. The debate 
therefore transitioned into a question of whether same-sex parents do or do not 
reproduce or teach their children about gender and sexual orientation identities (i.e., 
the immutability of such traits). This debate is characterized as a “distraction” 
because, as previously discussed in Part I, courts no longer recognize immutability 
as a decisive factor in the level-of-scrutiny analysis. 
The following sections summarize the testimony introduced by each side’s 
experts over the course of eight days of testimony related to the question of whether 
the Michigan statute survived rational basis review.87 The parties were directed to 
focus their testimony on the rationales offered by State defendants: “(1) providing 
children with ‘biologically connected’ role models of both genders that are necessary 
to foster healthy psychological development; (2) avoiding the unintended 
consequences that might result from redefining marriage; (3) upholding tradition 
and morality; and (4) promoting the transition of ‘naturally procreated relationships 
into stable unions.’”88 The first subsection summarizes the testimony about the 
justification itself, the existence or absence of the “No Difference Consensus.” The 
 
83. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 3. 
84. For clarity, “Defendants” will refer to the state defendants, Governor Richard Snyder and 
Attorney General Bill Schuette, who were represented by the same trial counsel. Defendant Lisa Brown, 
Oakland Country Clerk, was represented separately. Brown took the position that she was “ready to 
move forward with the issuance of licenses to same sex couples.” Id. at 55. 
85. Id. at 40. 
86. Id. at 64–65 (discussing poorer outcomes among children raised by same-sex parents 
compared to children raised by opposite-sex parents, and including “[m]ore female sex partners among 
women [and m]ore male sex partners among men.”). 
87. The Sixth Circuit precedent does not consider sexual orientation a suspect or quasisuspect 
classification. See Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012); Scarborough v. 
Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006). 
88. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
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second subsection lays out a related issue—whether the “convenience studies” used 
to form the “No Difference Consensus” are reliable and an adequate basis to justify 
a finding that the Michigan law does not satisfy rational basis. 
This summary should be read with two purposes in mind. First, although the 
explicit focus in DeBoer is on “outcomes for children,” the implicit focus was the 
immutability of sexual orientation. In short, Defendant’s argument is that the best 
environment to raise a child is one in which it is raised by a biologically related, 
married, mother and father. Claims about the benefits of biological parenting are 
code for dual-gender parenting, in which sex-differentiated gender roles are key, 
rather than a biological relationship to the child.89 And, as Part III demonstrates, 
the desire for sex-differentiated gender role modeling is ultimately about the desire 
for straight role models for children. Second, the disagreement between experts 
about “outcomes for children” is a rabbit hole, distracting us from more pressing 
discussions of normative questions about the state’s interest in heterosexual 
children. 
B. The “No Difference Consensus” 
At trial, Plaintiffs primarily sought to prove the “No Difference Consensus”—
the conclusion that there is no difference between outcomes for children of same-
sex parents and children of opposite-sex parents.90 Supported by professional 
organizations,91 Plaintiffs claimed the following: 
There’s no scientific basis for concluding that lesbian mothers and gay 
fathers are unfit parents on the basis of their sexual orientation. Overall, 
the results of the research suggest that development, adjustment, and well 
being of children with lesbian and gay parents do not differ markedly than 
that of children raised by heterosexual parents.92 
Plaintiffs’ counsel responded to the possibility that the court would find the 
competing studies inconclusive, arguing that “[a]nother generation of Michigan’s 
children should not have to await the perfect longitudinal study before they have 
rights, before they can enjoy stability, before they can really count on that second 
parent.”93 
Defendants, on the other hand, sought to prove that children fare worse when 
raised by LBG parents, and that the social research science on LBG parenting does 
not reach such a consensus.94 Regarding the first point, Defendants stated the 
following in their Opening Statement: 
 
89. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 83, 92 (2013). 
90. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 18. 
91. Id. The organizations supporting same-sex parenting are the American Psychological 
Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescence Psychiatry, the National 
Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America. 
92. Id. (citing language from the American Psychological Association). 
93. Id. at 36. 
94. One of Defendants’ experts was disqualified from testifying because he was not deemed to 
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Our experts are going to tell you that there are reasons for defining 
marriage as between one man and one woman that have nothing to do with 
animus. Our experts are going to explain to you why the “No Difference 
Consensus” that plaintiffs rely on is flawed. They will tell you that the 
studies relied on to come to this so-called “No Difference Consensus” 
suffer from three major deficiencies.95 
On the latter point, Defendants’ counsel stated, “we’re dealing with . . . a new and 
emerging area of social science. Same sex marriage has only been in existence in the 
United States since 2004. A decade, your Honor, is not enough time to determine 
with any certainty the affects that same sex marriage will have.”96 
Psychologist David Brodzinksy was Plaintiffs’ first witness and testified that 
there are no “discernable differences” between children who were raised by same-
sex couples from those raised by opposite-sex couples.97 Brodzinsky’s opinion was 
based on a number of studies that measured “child outcomes” based on long-term 
adjustment difficulties, which are predicted by a number of measures, including 
psychological adjustment, gender role behavior, peer relationships, school 
functioning, school progress, behavior and symptomatology, victimization, and 
conduct problems like illicit substance abuse and delinquency.98 He testified that 
positive child adjustment was correlated with factors including the quality of parent-
child relationship, the quality of the relationship between the parents, the 
characteristics and styles of parenting that parents adopt, the types of educational 
opportunities that children are afforded, the resources within the family, the 
resources outside of the family, and the mental health of the parents.99 
When asked whether there was any evidence that children need a male and 
female parent for positive child development, Brodzinsky replied, “The answer is 
no. It’s not the gender of the parent that’s the key. It’s the quality of parenting that’s 
being offered by whoever is there, husband or wife, two women, two men, a single 
 
be an expert. Ed White, Michigan’s Witness in Gay Marriage Trial Barred, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 3, 2014, 
12:11 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/michigans-witness-gay-marriage-trial-barred-171156615.html 
[https://perma.cc/4RKX-TU93?type=image]. 
95. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 43–44. 
96. Id. at 42–43. 
97. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 30. In his direct examination, Brodzinsky 
specifically stated the following: 
   My conclusions about the outcomes for children, based upon this research, is that 
children of gay and lesbian individuals show no discernable differences in outcomes and in 
general characteristics, developmental characteristics, compared to children of 
heterosexuals.  
   And the other conclusion that I reach is that the parenting qualities of gays and lesbians 
are no different than the parenting qualities of heterosexual individuals. And the couple 
relationships of those who are parenting children are no different in heterosexual families 
and gay and lesbian families. 
Id. Brodzinsky is a developmental clinical and forensic psychologist, specializing in adoption and foster 
care, child development, nontraditional family life, parenting by same-sex couples, and parenting by gay 
and lesbian individuals. Id. at 1–5. 
98. Id. at 26–27. 
99. Id. at 10. Brodzinsky also testified extensively about the increased risk of maladjustment for 
adopted children, based on factors not related to biological ties. Id. at 40. 
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parent, as long as the factors that we listed up there [correlated with positive child 
adjustment] are present.”100 Brodzinsky testified that, in his opinion, there are also 
no differences in outcomes when comparing donor-conceived children to children 
raised by their biological parents.101 
Plaintiffs’ second expert sociologist Michael Rosenfeld likewise focused on the 
scholarly consensus within the discipline of sociology. He concluded, “children 
raised by same sex couples are at no disadvantage.”102 Based on his cross-sectional 
study of approximately seven hundred thousand primary school children from the 
2000 Census data, Rosenfeld found the following:  
[P]rogress through school for children raised by same sex couples is just as 
good as the progress through school for children raised by any other kind 
of family when you compare similarly situated families, that is, families with 
the same incomes, families with the same parental education and so on.103 
Rosenfeld’s research controlled for factors like parental income, parental education, 
the child’s relationship to the head of the household, race, and whether the child 
lives in a suburb or city.104 Other studies that attempted to replicate his own study 
of children’s progress in school based on Census data came up with different 
conclusions because Rosenfeld’s study excluded children “whose family [situations] 
through school we didn’t know,” thus excluding, for example, nonbiological 
children of the head of household and children who had not been living with the 
same parents for the five years prior to the Census.105 On cross-examination, 
Rosenfeld admitted that his study was limited by the imprecision of the Census in 
identifying same-sex couples, in identifying relationships between family members, 
and in measuring outcomes for children based only on progress through school.106 
Economist Douglas Allen, expert for the Defendants, identified Rosenfeld’s 
study using data collected from the U.S. Census as the first study that utilized a large 
random sample, calling it a “watershed paper.”107 Allen and two others replicated 
Rosenfeld’s study.108 Based on his replication of Rosenfeld’s study, Allen testified 
that he did not agree with the Rosenfeld results, criticizing Rosenfeld’s 
 
100. Id. at 19. 
101. Id. at 61. 
102. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 4, at 51. Rosenfeld further testified that the 
consensus in the field of sociology was expressed through an Amicus Brief submitted by the American 
Sociological Association for Perry and Windsor. Michael Rosenfeld is an Associate Professor of Sociology 
at Stanford University, and he concentrates his work in family and marriage, children and child 
development, and marriage and divorce. Id. at 48. 
103. Id. at 61. 
104. Id. at 66–68. 
105. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 2, pt. 1, at 35–37. 
106. Id. at 39. 
107. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 8, at 32. 
108. Id. 
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interpretations of the statistical differences,109 his sample restrictions,110 and his 
control methodology in the regression.111 The only other large random sample study 
that Allen could identify was his own, using the Canada Census, which had an 
advantage over the U.S. Census because couples could self-identify as a same-sex 
couple.112 Allen’s analysis of the Canada census data showed that girls raised in gay 
or lesbian households have a decreased likelihood of graduating high school, but 
Allen found no statistically significant difference for boys raised in gay or lesbian 
households.113 Allen testified that the U.S. Census results and the Canada Census 
results were the only two large studies available that provide a reliable measure of 
actual difference in outcomes of children in same-sex households and children in 
opposite-sex households.114 
Rosenfeld’s conclusions were also criticized by Defense expert witness Joseph 
Price, an economist who testified that when he analyzed the data Rosenfeld used, 
he came to the conclusion that there is a difference in progress in school between 
children raised by same-sex couples versus children raised by opposite-sex 
parents.115 Price and Rosenfeld used different omitted groups when analyzing the 
same data set.116 Price found that there was a statistically significant level of 
difference in the data, indicating that a child raised by a same-sex couple is less likely 
to make normal progress in school and ultimately that the child is more likely to be 
held back.117 Price also testified that “the odds of a child in a heterosexual married 
household is about 15 percent higher that [sic] will be making normal progress 
 
109. Allen’s criticism was that Rosenfeld concluded that there was no difference between 
normal progression in children raised by same-sex households and children raised in opposite-sex 
households, when Allen instead suggested that there was no statistical difference. Id. at 44. 
110. The “own child” restriction was a way in which Rosenfeld compared biological children 
of same-sex parents to biological children of opposite-sex parents, leaving out, for example, children 
who were not related to the head of the household and adopted children. Id. at 45–46. When Dr. Allen 
took into account the problems he found with Dr. Rosenfeld’s sample restrictions, Dr. Allen found 
statistically significant differences. Id. at 49. 
111. Id. at 34, 40–41. The last aspect of the study Allen criticized was the five-year residency 
restriction, which Rosenfeld employed as a “proxy variable” for a previous transition in the family, like 
divorce or separation. Id. at 47, 50. Allen opined that the five-year period was overinclusive—that 
families that happened to move would be excluded from the results. Id. at 47–48. To address this 
problem, Allen testified that his study took into consideration whether the family had moved in the last 
five years. Id. at 52. 
112. Id. at 32, 56. The study based on the Canada Census, unlike Rosenfeld’s study based on 
the U.S. Census, could only measure whether a child graduated from high school, not the child’s 
progress through school. Id. at 59–60. 
113. Id. at 61. 
114. Id. at 39. 
115. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 6, pt. 3, at 55–56. 
116. Id. at 59. For example, Rosenfeld applied the “stability restriction,” which asked each 
person in the household whether they were in the same household five years ago, whereas Price did 
not impose the same restriction. Id. at 80. Price criticized this restriction on the grounds that it 
dramatically reduced the precision of the estimates and also cut off two of the channels through which 
family structure affects child outcomes—relatedness and stability. Id. at 88. 
117. Id. at 56. 
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through school than a child raised by a same sex couples [sic].”118 Responding to 
Price’s criticism, Rosenfeld testified that Price’s replication of Rosenfeld’s study 
exaggerated the results by at least fifty times.119 
To justify the Michigan law, Defendants called on sociologist Mark Regnerus. 
Regnerus based much of his testimony on the results of his New Family Structure 
Study (NFSS), a large population-based study that called into question the “No 
Differences Consensus” with respect to the intact biological family, based on data 
collected from young adults between the ages of eighteen and thirty-nine.120 The 
NFSS concluded that there are twenty-four differences out of forty chosen 
outcomes121 between children who grew up in intact, biological families, and 
children whose mothers had a same-sex relationship at some point during their 
childhood.122 There were fewer differences for children whose fathers had a same-
sex relationship.123 The majority of these respondents were children of failed 
heterosexual unions.124 Some of the outcomes in which children whose parents had 
a same-sex relationship fared worse than children with parents with an intact, 
opposite-sex marriage were the increased likelihoods of being on public assistance 
or unemployment; having an affair while married or cohabiting; having a sexually 
transmitted infection; using marijuana; smoking tobacco; being arrested or pleading 
guilty to a nonminor offense; having a female sexual partner if the participant was 
a woman; and having a male sexual partner if the participant was a man.125 Children 
whose parents had a same-sex relationship were identified as having a decreased 
likelihood of full-time employment, educational attainment, and safety or 
security.126 Taking all of the studies done on outcomes for children and the 
limitations of these studies into consideration, Regnerus testified that no 
conclusions, and particularly not a “no difference” conclusion, should be drawn.127 
Regnerus testified that it “seems premature to say that something that involves a 
 
118. Id. at 64–65. 
119. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 4, at 87. 
120. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 5, pt. 2, at 38–39. 
121. Id. at 49. The forty outcomes were chosen out of between eighty and one hundred possible 
distinctive outcomes. These forty were chosen to be a broad representation of the child’s formative 
years. Id. 
122. Id. at 40. Notably, Regnerus testified that the NFSS participants were asked “Did your 
mother ever have a romantic relationship with a member of the same sex?” and “Did your father ever 
have a romantic relationship with a member of the same sex?” Id. at 41. 
123. Id. at 40. 
124. Id. at 52. 
125. Id. at 64–65. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 86–87. 
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reduced kinship,128 meaning somebody is not a biological parent to the child, to 
claim there are no differences.”129 
Regnerus recognized the limitations of the NFSS, primarily that it was not a 
longitudinal study but was cross-sectional.130 The study did not focus on parental 
same-sex orientation or sexual orientation identity.131 The NFSS did not ask about 
the child’s origins, meaning that it did not take into account whether the child was 
conceived using assistive reproductive technology.132 In summation, Regnerus 
testified that the ideal environment for children would be one in which a biological 
child is raised by their married mother and father, and that other environments are 
necessary concessions.133 
Regnerus was surprised by the severe and swift criticism of his study upon its 
release.134 Earlier in the trial, Brodsinksy had criticized Regnerus’ study on the 
grounds that the adult children selected for the study were born into families with 
heterosexual parents, were not raised by same-sex parents, and generally had not 
lived with the parent and their same-sex partner.135 The study compared the 
experiences of young adults of intact marital families to families involving 
“diminished kinship,” which Brodzinsky also criticized.136 Similarly, Rosenfeld 
criticized Regnerus’ study on the basis that “[Regnerus] wasn’t actually analyzing the 
data for children who are really raised by same sex couples.”137 Analyzing Regnerus’ 
data, Rosenfeld concluded that “what predicts the negative outcomes in these 
subjects is the number of transitions they went through as children.”138 
C. Convenience Sampling 
Experts for both Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed that the majority of studies 
on LGB parenting used convenience sampling.139 This type of sampling is often 
 
128. The term “reduced kinship” refers to families that are not in the ideal situation in which a 
married mother and father in a stable relationship reside with their child, which includes adoptive and 
foster families, as well as an otherwise intact family where a parent is absent due to, for example, military 
service. Id. at 33–34. 
129. Id. at 29. 
130. Id. at 67. Put simply, a cross-sectional study is “a snapshot at one point in time,” and is not 
adequate for addressing causal claims. Id. 
131. Id. The purpose of the study, according to Regnerus, was to study children’s parents’ 
relationship behavior rather than the parent’s self-identification of their sexual orientation. Id. at 72. 
132. Id. at 69. 
133. Id. at 113–14. 
134. Id. at 94. 
135. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 64. 
136. Id. at 64–65. 
137. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 4, at 98. Rosenfeld explained that Regnerus 
“was building into his comparison of family type a comparison between children who had not had any 
family transitions,” in which the mother and father were married to each other and stayed married for 
the duration of the child’s minority life, to “children who had many.” Id. at 101. 
138. Id. at 100. 
139. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1 pt. 3, at 31–32 (testifying for Plaintiffs); Transcript 
of Record, supra note 1, vol. 6, pt. 3, at 46–47 (testifying for Defendants). 
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criticized because it is based on small sample sizes of self-selecting populations, 
which can mean that the results of the study are not representative of a larger 
population. If, as Defendants argued, the studies are only representative of a certain 
population (generally wealthy, white lesbians), then the results of the studies cannot 
be extrapolated to make claims about the outcomes for children raised by LGB 
parents in the general population.140 Therefore, Defendants claimed, it was rational 
for the people of Michigan to provide the best environment for children, one in 
which they are raised by a biologically-related and married mother and father, 
achieved in part by excluding same-sex couples from marriage.141 
Addressing this criticism, Brodzinsky testified that the methodology of 
convenience sampling is the “bread and butter” of psychology.142 Convenience 
studies allow researchers to look “inside the family”; they allow researchers to take 
into consideration the resources of parents, the style of parenting, the relationships 
parents have to children, and the relationship between the parents.143 
All four of Defendants’ experts criticized the use of convenience sampling. 
Regnerus suggested that random, nationally representative, longitudinal, and 
replicable studies would be a better base for major decisions like a state’s marriage 
ban.144 Additionally, Regnerus suggested that this type of study is needed to 
conclude that no difference exists between outcomes for children raised by same-
sex parents and children raised by opposite-sex parents.145 Price called into question 
the limitations of convenience sampling, noting “it’s not clear whether you are 
actually going to learn something about the group you care about because you are 
going to end up with a group that selected themselves into your study.”146 Allen 
reviewed sixty studies and concluded that they are not generalizable—the samples 
focused on lesbian parents instead of both gay and lesbian parents and were cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal.147 Lastly, Loren Marks, an expert in family studies, 
responded to the American Psychological Association’s (APA) position statement 
on lesbian and gay parenting.148 Marks testified that the studies were not 
representative of the population in terms of cultural, ethnic, and economic 
diversity.149 The studies were based on convenience samples made mostly of lesbian 
 
140. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 7, pt. 1, at 82. 
141. Id. at 41–43. 
142. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 33, 36. 
143. Id. at 36–37. 
144. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 5, pt. 2, at 21–26. Regnerus opined that it is unwise 
to rely on nonprobability studies “to settle an intellectual about No Differences.” Id. at 111. 
145. Id. at 36–37. 
146. Id. at 46–47. 
147. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 8, at 21, 23, 27. Dr. Allen did admit that there was 
a consensus reached in the study, because the researchers came to the same conclusion, but that the 
consensus was not warranted because it was based on fifty-five “preliminary” studies. Id. at 38. 
148. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 7, pt. 1, at 64. Marks is an associate professor at 
Louisiana State University. Id. at 58–59. He describes family studies as a hybrid between psychology 
and sociology. Id. 
149. Id. at 82–83. 
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mothers—white, well educated, and wealthy—but not gay fathers.150 The studies 
also often used single-parent heterosexual homes as the group representing all 
heterosexual parents.151 
On Friday, March 21, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge Bernard A. Friedman 
ruled that the ban was unconstitutional, sending almost three hundred same-sex 
couples to clerks’ offices for marriage licenses over the weekend.152 The following 
Tuesday, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a stay on 
marriage licenses for same-sex couples to allow the state to appeal the ruling.153 On 
January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari for 
consolidated cases from the Sixth Circuit.154 
III. SHIFTING FROM OBJECTIVE TO NORMATIVE QUESTIONS  
ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
A comparison of the previous sections on the movement away from seemingly 
objective questions about the nature of adult sexual orientation in Part I and the 
movement towards objective questions about “outcomes for children” in the 
parenting context in Part II demonstrates that there is something unique at stake in 
the latter context. This Part asserts that children are the difference—children are 
gay rights opponents’ redirected focus from the acceptability of same-sex 
relationships. Children are the proxy for anxieties about the production and 
reproduction of divergent sexual orientation identities, and they allow the debate 
about the immutability of sexual orientation to resurface. Rather than returning to 
the debate over the nature of sexual orientation, courts should dismiss these 
questions as irrelevant and instead center normative questions, drawing on the 
treatment of sexual orientation identity in the equal protection context. 
A. The Child as Proxy for Anxieties About Divergent Identities 
Professor Clifford Rosky has characterized the anxieties about divergent 
identities in children as the “fear of the queer child.”155 Describing this fear, Rosky 
notes that it includes “fears that exposing children to homosexuality and gender 
variance will make them more likely to develop homosexual desires, engage in 
homosexual acts, form homosexual relationships, deviate from traditional gender 
 
150. Id. at 84. 
151. Id. at 86. 
152. Order Granting Motion to Stay at 1, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 
14-1341) (granting Michigan’s motion to stay the district court’s order pending final disposition of 
Michigan’s appeal). 
153. Kathleen Gray & Gina Damron, Appeals Court Keeps Stay on Michigan Gay Marriages, USA 
TODAY (March 25, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/25/
michigan-gay-marriage/6883623 [http://perma.cc/F4J8-8L9A]. 
154. Oral arguments were heard on August 6, 2014. Maya Srikrishnan, Federal Court Takes Up 
Gay Marriage Cases from 4 States, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
nationnow/la-na-nn-gay-marriage-20140806-story.html [http://perma.cc/7ATA-TFW2]. 
155. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, supra note 12, at 608. 
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norms, or identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.”156 Identifying this fear 
is useful for thinking about “child outcomes” because fear of the queer child is really 
a fear that sexual orientation could be transmitted. If a parent can pass on the trait 
of same-sex sexual orientation to a child who is otherwise not “born gay,” then the 
child’s sexual orientation is not innate, not immutable. This fear, then, is also a fear 
of the mutability of sexual orientation. Tracing the history of this fear from ancient 
Greece, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to today,157 Rosky notes its 
adaptability: “Over the course of centuries, the fear of the queer child has proved 
to be a remarkably nimble adversary—broad, subtle, and manifold.”158 More 
recently, “[d]uring the 1990s, opponents of LGBT rights shifted away from explicit 
claims about children’s homosexuality, in favor of increasingly vague claims about 
children’s variance from traditional gender roles and identities.”159 Rosky thus 
identifies the ways in which this fear of the queer child is often blanketed in vague 
claims that mask discussions about gender and sexuality variance. 
Relying on family law cases, Rosky demonstrates how gay and lesbian parents 
are often stereotyped as either recruiters, “people who overtly encourage children 
to become homosexual by taking them to pro-gay events and exposing them to pro-
gay media,” or as role models, “people who subtly encourage children to become 
homosexual by providing influential models of same-sex relationships.”160 Unlike 
the overt stereotypes and criticisms made of parents in child custody disputes Rosky 
analyzes, Defendants in DeBoer implicitly alleged that Jayne and April, as role 
models, will provide suboptimal conditions for the rearing of their children—that 
Jayne and April are ill equipped to provide an environment in which their children 
can become straight boys and girls. 
DeBoer illustrates what Rosky identifies—that opponents of LGBT rights 
continue to fear the transmission of sexual orientation and gender identity and use 
their concern for children as the proxy for this fear. Experts on both sides measured 
outcomes for children in terms of gender, sexual orientation, and sexual experience. 
For example, Plaintiffs’ expert Brodzinsky discussed children’s gender role 
behavior.161 Defendants’ expert Regenerus measured outcomes through children’s 
nonmonogamous relationships, same-sex relationships, and same-sex sexual 
experience.162 Specifically, Defendants argue that the “optimal environment” for 
raising children is one in which a child is raised by a married, biological mother and 
 
156. Id. at 608. 
157. Id. at 618–32. 
158. Id. at 667. 
159. Id. at 659. 
160. Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of 
Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 294 (2009). 
161. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 3, at 26–27. 
162. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 5, pt. 2, at 64–65. 
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father.163 This argument presumes that mothers and fathers parent differently.164 
The mother and father are assumed to play complementary parenting roles, in 
which, for example, the mother teaches her child not only what it is to be a woman, 
but also that women are attracted to men. Therefore, gender-based role modeling 
arguments are not just about demonstrating proper gender roles to a child, but also 
how a proper gender identity is a straight identity.165 Gender-based role modeling 
is, underneath the rhetoric about optimal environments and child outcomes, about 
the desire for parents to be straight role models.166 
The rationales underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Lofton support the 
proposition that children are the unique factor catalyzing the reemergence of the 
immutability debate. The court began its discussion by distinguishing adoption from 
other contexts, like criminal law, government-benefits schemes, and access to 
public forums, because “the state’s overriding interest is the best interest of the 
children.”167 To reiterate from Part II, the Eleventh Circuit then justified 
constitutionally suspect classifications made in the adoption context “[b]ecause of 
the primacy of the welfare of the child.”168 Opponents of same-sex marriage share 
this concern for children and the role of the state, and similarly use children to 
justify otherwise constitutionally intolerable classifications. 
Unpacking Defendant’s argument in DeBoer reveals an empirical question 
about sexual orientation and gender identity: how does a parent’s sexual orientation 
influence a child’s sexual orientation or gender identity, or are those identities 
biologically determined? In other words, is sexual orientation immutable? The 
process of answering these questions should be guided by the heightened scrutiny 
debate in the equal protection context. 
B. Drawing on Lessons from the Heightened Scrutiny Debate 
In the level-of-scrutiny debate described in Part I, courts treat immutability 
not as a question of objective evidence, but as a question of whether the 
 
163. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 41–42; Transcript of Record, supra note 
1, vol. 6, pt. 1, at 73–74. 
164. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 6, pt. 3, at 97–99 (testifying that “mothers spend[ ] 
more time reading, talking, and doing house work with their children around the home,” but that in 
contrast, fathers “tend to stress competition, challenge, initiative, risk taking, and independence”). 
165. Rosky describes this desire as “draw[ing] support from conventional assumptions about 
the process of sexual development—that before puberty, children have both homosexual and 
heterosexual tendencies, and that during puberty, they develop sexual relationships based on models 
provided by adults, especially parents.” Rosky, supra note 160, at 295. 
166. Professor William N. Eskridge posits that marriage litigation is the best place for gay rights 
advocates to challenge these assumptions: “From a liberal perspective, marriage as one man, one 
woman is the ultimate testing ground for full public acceptance that variations in sex, gender, and 
sexuality are all benign and not just tolerable.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in 
American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1352 (2010). 
167. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809–10 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
168. Id. at 810. 
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characteristic is so central to the person’s identity as to make it abhorrent for the 
government to penalize a person for refusing to change it.169 Likewise, courts should 
treat LGB parenting with a similar apathy for empirical questions about the 
transmission of sexual orientation and gender identity. Empirical questions are 
distracting—constantly changing in form, purpose, and nuance; they are therefore 
“hard to pin down.”170 Empirical questions on identity are also extremely difficult 
to settle, as evidenced by the testimonial mess of experts in the DeBoer trial.171 As a 
litigation strategy, focusing on empirical questions and expert testimony is a costly 
endeavor. 
Gay rights advocates impede this paradigm shift when making broad 
conclusions about the immutability of sexual orientation identity. For example, 
counsel for Jayne and April opened trial by stating: 
[Thirty years ago,] in the face of that kind of discrimination most lesbians 
and some gay men were trying to live straight lives. Like a lot of other 
people they were inspiring. They wanted the State’s ideal family, too. They 
wanted the picket fence, the children. They wanted an intact family. Many 
lesbians and gay men were trying to function in heterosexual marriages. 
Predictably it didn’t work. You can’t choose your orientation. Now we 
know that, didn’t then.172 
While grounded in doctrine, gay rights advocates’ use of immutability fails as a 
rhetorical and political strategy, actively alienating those who do not experience their 
sexual orientation as immutable.173 Instead, advocates should use the opportunity 
to expose these arguments about biological preferentialism and dual-gender 
parenting174 for what they are: claims masking the desire for heterosexual role 
modeling. As Professor Douglas NeJaime suggests, “[b]iological preferentialism 
reinvents arguments steeped in stereotypes. It should not be smuggled in to courts’ 
analysis as a veiled justification for laws that maintain the sex-based distinction in 
marriage and withhold marriage from same-sex couples.”175 Preferences for 
heterosexual role modeling invite debate about the immutability of sexual 
orientation and its relevance—again, a distraction from a normative debate. Instead, 
 
169. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
170. Rosky, supra note 12, at 667. Describing the fear itself, Rosky says, “[l]ike the facts it 
describes, the fear is a moving target; it is hard to pin down and dispute on empirical grounds.” Id. 
171. Id. at 668. “In one situation after another, when the empirical strategy is deployed against 
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval fears, it runs up against the inherent uncertainty and 
incompleteness of the factual record.” Id. 
172. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 1, pt. 1, at 32. 
173. See Halley, supra note 30, at 528. “Immutability offers no theoretical foundation for legal 
protection of those gay men and lesbians who experience their sexual orientation as contingent, 
mutable, chosen. . . . An adequate legal theory should protect the entire social class on whose behalf it 
is articulated.” Id. 
174. See NeJaime, supra note 89. 
175. Id. at 95. 
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advocates should recognize the replication of immutability arguments and appeal to 
its irrelevance in the level of scrutiny context. 
Once LGB advocates move on from debating the transmission of sexual 
orientation from adult to child, they can focus on the more pressing issue—
challenging the normative premise that children are better off straight.176 As a 
practical matter, the resurfacing of immutability arguments is an obstacle for LGB 
parenting, delaying, for example, the possibility of easing the plight of foster care 
youth. As Sankaran and Gates’ testimonies in the DeBoer trial revealed, barriers to 
LGB parenting only worsen the dire situation faced by foster youth.177 By focusing 
on whether sexual orientation and gender identity can be transmitted, courts delay 
the more important question: what is wrong with sexual orientation and gender 
identity variance? Every delay to the resolution of that question keeps foster youth 
in the foster system when they would otherwise be fostered or adopted by LGB 
persons, couples, or families. In broader terms, the delay of this question keeps the 
children of LGB parents unsure of the legitimacy of their own families. 
This normative question about sexual orientation and gender variance is 
pressing. Professor William N. Eskridge answers it with what he terms “benign 
variation,” which suggests “no gender role is inevitably ‘best’ for every woman or 
every man, and no sexual practice or orientation is inevitably ‘best for every 
person.”178 Eskridge argues that the federal and state governments are already well 
on their way to fully adopting the idea of benign variation, as evidenced by the 
proliferation of antidiscrimination laws.179 From this forthcoming consensus, 
Eskridge predicts, the Supreme Court will adopt the benign variation perspective 
and “disable the state from insisting on heterosexuality.”180 Beyond benign 
variation, Eskridge argues that sexual and gender variation should also be thought 
of as productive, leading to questions such as “What messages should we be sending 
the nation’s youth? What relationship forms work best for family needs?”181 These 
questions will not come to the forefront of the debate until questions about the 
immutability of sexual orientation, and particularly about the immutability of 
parents’ sexual orientation, are disregarded. 
  
 
176. Rosky, supra note 12, at 667–68. 
177. Gates testified that same-sex couples are roughly twice as likely to raise a foster child than 
their opposite-sex counterparts. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 3, at 31. Sankaran, a clinical 
professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School in the Child Advocacy Law Clinic and the 
Child Welfare Appellate Clinic, testified that eliminating barriers to both members of a same-sex couple 
adopting or fostering a child by allowing the couple to marry would result in fewer children in the 
adoption and foster care systems. Transcript of Record, supra note 1, vol. 2, pt. 2, at 63–65. 
178. Eskridge, supra note 166, at 1341. 
179. Id. at 1350. 
180. Id. at 1352. 
181. Id. at 1360. 
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CONCLUSION 
DeBoer demonstrates how anxieties about divergent sexual orientation and 
gender identities evolve and become more sophisticated as legal arguments. It is 
generally settled that whether sexual orientation is immutable is an unnecessary 
inquiry for purposes of heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Yet 
in cases involving children and parenting, the relevance of immutability seems to 
reemerge, indicating that children are proxies for sexual orientation transmission 
fears. Instead of giving this fear credence, lawsuits involving LGB parenting should 
instead recognize and draw on the settlement of the immutability factor in level-of-
scrutiny doctrine to make room for the more pressing normative debate about 
benign variation of sexual orientation and gender identities. 
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